This paper considers the dynamics of the process used in creating the political conditions to bring about the end of political violence in Northern Ireland in the period from the IRA Hunger Strike in 1981 to the IRA and Loyalist ceasefires in 1994. It explains some of the key concepts that were forged in the intense political back channel pre-negotiations that culminated eventually in opening the door to peace talks. It also shows the crucial role that third parties can play in building the capacity for parties to understand each other and create a peace process architecture.
CONFLICT ENGAGEMENT
The Red Zone Pre-negotiation phase to end the violence and agree principles to get to the talks table
Community despair, lack of hope, fear and intimidation are prevalent when dehumanisation and violence continues. The task is to engage the protagonists and win their confidence to break out of cycles of tit-for-tat violence on the ground. New political thinking in the secret back channels can explore the principles on which talks can commence, nudge the parties towards a ceasefire and build the new relationships of trust.
Ends with ceasefire
In this phase, the negotiation process is paramount to shift on-the-ground realities of the conflict. Involves moving forward on many difficult but interrelated issues simultaneously. Elections may be used to create the talks table.
Each side depends on the other to sell the compromise deal to their own people. Trust builds to sustain the settlement.
Ends with accord
Problems of implementing the settlement are addressed, requiring painful adjustment between the parties in a spirit of reconciliation. Parties have to live up to the commitments made and get compliance on security reform and the decommissioning of weapons. Truth recovery regarding gross human rights violations, with victims and ex-combatants coming forward to tell their story.
CONFLICT RESOLUTION 3. CONFLICT TRANSFORMATION The Blue Zone
Talks about the design of the talks table and the negotiation of a political settlement
The Yellow Zone
Implementation of negotiated settlement and post-conflict transformation
Seeds of Irish peace process
It began with what republicans saw as a tragedy involving the deaths of ten republican hunger paper in this hand, and an Armalite in this hand, we take power in Ireland?" (English 2004: 225) .
While a dual strategy of guns and votes is chilling to democrats, it proved a crucial turning point for Adams who began to float ideas about how politics could deliver Republican objectives where violence could not. Loyalist leader Gusty Spence understood the significance: "Without Margaret
Thatcher's ham-handling, we wouldn't have had the political strength Sinn Fein gained…Consequently we wouldn't have had the peace process" [Garland 2001: 243] . Ultimately militants will only be convinced if they see the political benefits of winding down violence. 
Following the Brighton attack, a concerted high level political effort was made between Garret
Fitzgerald and Margaret Thatcher that involved summit meetings, diplomacy and back channels. When they met at Chequers in November 1984, Fitzgerald went over the issues again of why a nationalist minority needed special treatment in terms of policing/security and political momentum. Amazingly, out of the clash of polar opposite views between these two heavyweights, Mrs Thatcher suddenly felt "We're now tackling the problem in detail for the first time" (FitzGerald 1991: 521) , showing that she loved intense political argument. Ideas about a joint border zone and a joint security commission got discussed but the Irish side were unwilling to go in this direction because they would be taking on responsibilities without power. The Irish would have to be politically involved in any security instrument. At this stage, Mrs Thatcher was opposed to any Irish involvement.
Despite disastrous press conferences following the summit, when Mrs Thatcher turned down the three political options put forward in the New Ireland Forum report in her famous "out, out, out" (UDA) began to re-think the future of the union and their own identity through self-education and intense political discussions on how the conflict could be brought to an end. The Long Kesh prison regime allowed political prisoners access to books and Open University courses, as well as the ability to meet, debate and deeply reflect on what the violence had achieved regardless of whether you were attacking or defending. They slowly came to a similar realisation that the use of violence/armed struggle is counter-productive and more could be gained for their community from a different political strategy.
Despite all the political progress between the Governments and within republicanism, the shrill sound of republican rhetoric around the removal of the British presence in Ireland served only to make
Unionists and Loyalists more suspicious of republican motives. The Unionist community were now asking themselves did this now mean they had to go? They were in fact the British presence in Ireland and no amount of violence, or historical revisionism would change that fact. 
Mutual Hurting Stalemate
Despite the best efforts of British security forces to manage the security threat, the low intensity How much violence has there to be before parties say "enough is enough"? How much hurting has there to be before people shout stop? Zartman (2000) defines the mutually hurting stalemate as that point when the parties perceive the costs and prospects of continuing the conflict to be more burdensome than the costs and prospects of settlement. This opens a ripe moment when it becomes possible for political leaders to seize the opportunity to get out of the grip of the tit-for-tat spiral and open up a discussion around future solutions.
Looking back, it is possible to see that this ripe moment came in two waves -one in the late 1980's and one in the early 1990's after more atrocities. The British military strategists realised they could not beat the IRA militarily but they could certainly contain them. In fact, the IRA's operational capacity was being heavily undermined by informers and the success of British intelligence gathering through more effective electronic devices. BBC journalist Peter Taylor reported: "The Brits simply knew too much" (Taylor 2002: 308 Brooke became his Northern Ireland Secretary of State. Brooke was a shrewd political operator with a good understanding of Ireland, its history and politics, because of his Irish roots. He reopened the secret channel with the IRA senior leaders that went through Brendan Duddy, the Derry businessman (Moloney 2007: p406) , and got back the dramatic message that the IRA wanted to end the conflict. John Major pondered whether it was genuine and believable (Major 1999: 431) : "Were the Provisionals really ready to end violence? Or was it just a ploy? Did they wish to suck the government into negotiations in which they would demand unjustifiable concessions in return for an end to their killing of the innocent? If that failed, would they then blame us for the renewal of violence?" Jonathon Powell, Chief of Staff to Prime Minister Tony Blair, had similar thoughts some years later: "It is very difficult for governments in democracies to be seen to be talking to terrorists who are killing their people unjustifiably. But it is precisely your enemies, rather than your friends, you should talk to if you want to resolve a conflict." [Powell 2008: 312] .
Brooke was keenly aware of how republicans heard language and wanted to indicate a British willingness to help bring the conflict to an end. In November 1990, he made an astonishing public statement approved by John Major that echoed back what he knew was of strategic importance for the Reid/Hume/Adams back channel. He said the British government had "no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland .... Britain's purpose is not to occupy, oppress or to exploit." (Major 1999: 435) . What this meant was that if a clear majority of the people in Northern Ireland wished to leave the UK, Britain would not force them to remain. "It is not the aspiration to a sovereign, united Ireland against which we set our face, but it's violent expression." It was hard for the unionists to hear this message, deeply unsettling them, because they had come to rely on the Thatcher dictum that Northern Ireland was, as she put it, "as British as Finchley [her constituency in England]".
What they were now hearing from Peter Brooke and a new prime minister was that the status quo of rigid positions and ancient feuds was unacceptable and things had to change. Unionists heard this statement with some trepidation and sought to downplay its significance as an 'off the cuff' remark. They did not want even the slightest opening of a position that might be interpreted by their own hinterland as weakness in the face of IRA violence against members of their community.
Building on John Hume's thinking, Brooke initiated a process that sought to address the three sets of broken relationships -within Northern Ireland, between North and South and between Britain and Ireland. These became known as the interlocking 'three strands' with the key proviso that nothing would be agreed until everything was agreed. They would later be incorporated into the Good Friday Agreement 1998. John Major had struck up a friendship with Albert Reynolds when they met each other at the EU Council of Finance Ministers. By coincidence in 1992, they were now prime ministers and both approached the matter with less ideological baggage and no historical scores to settle. They saw the need for a safe deal in the knowledge that neither would sell the other short. The progress of their relationship was not without its hiccups and there were some tempestuous meetings between them, particularly the summit in Dublin; but Reynolds was determined to create the conditions for a ceasefire deal based on the nationalist consensus for peace that he had forged with the SDLP and Sinn Fein. 
Risking political credibility to end violence
Bill Clinton realised there was a sizable Irish American vote to be won when he ran as a presidential candidate and promised that if elected he would make Ireland a priority during his administration by appointing a special envoy. As part of the ongoing sequence of confidence building steps that were now underway following the announcement of the Downing Street Declaration, focus shifted towards pushing and pulling the republican movement into a ceasefire. In January 1994, the Irish government, John Hume and Sinn Fein lobbied President Clinton to allow Adams speak to a conference on Northern Ireland. The State Department and the British Embassy vigorously opposed it and ultimately it came down to the personal signature of the President. Pressure came on Clinton and his National Security advisor Nancy Soderberg to grant a 48-hour visa as a signal that the US were good for their word on backing the Nationalist consensus for peace. The problem for the United States was that this decision was needed to keep Sinn Fein and the IRA on course for a ceasefire but was intrinsically repugnant to every nerve ending in the US system, not because it was Adams but because the British were their closest international ally. The stakes could not have been higher and presented a major dilemma for the US administration.
In a smart political calculation, Soderberg and Clinton calculated that by granting the visa, this would commit Adams to deliver the IRA ceasefire and enable the peace process to go forward. If he did not deliver, then Clinton would walk away from any further support (Mallie & McKittrick 2000) .
However, this would give opponents of Adams in the republican community the excuse to say: "They only want one thing: our capitulation and the destruction of the IRA." In a last minute decision, the visa was granted and it turned out to be a public relations triumph for Adams, meeting members of Congress and appearing on TV talk shows. Adams scrupulously honoured the terms of the Clinton visa and only talked peace. When he returned home, Adams used the fact within Sinn Fein and the IRA that the Irish government had played a key role in securing his visa. The fact that the US went with the Irish position was proof that the peace process was advancing the political objectives of the republican movement. This changed the balance of power within the republican movement. If violence of any kind or even the threat of violence was to be continued, then all of the progress on the consensus between Dublin, Washington and the SDLP would melt away and they would be further back than ever. argued that the history of IRA ceasefires had always weakened the organisation and damaged the armed struggle, pushing the line that the British and Irish governments wanted to destroy republicans. They believed any peace process involving the IRA would end the struggle to remove the British from Ireland and turn into a compromise. So it was vitally important for Adams, that having gone this far, to bring the whole movement with him and limit the size of any break away splinter group. The internal management of the republican movement to avoid a possible split was now becoming increasingly crucial. This is why Gerry Adams felt compelled to walk with IRA volunteers in carrying the coffin of a dead IRA man who was killed while planting a bomb on the Protestant Shankill Road in October 1993. That bomb killed nine people. He also needed to demonstrate publicly his identity as one of the people because he knew he had a big ask of the republican movement in the months ahead. Following many secret meetings and the convening of an IRA army convention in the summer of 1994, the IRA was ready to take a decision. However, one more hurdle remained to be cleared. A visa was now required for veteran republican Joe Cahill to travel to the USA and reassure those who had supplied money for guns that the movement was moving into a new phase of the struggle, a phase characterised by political action and not military struggle. The key message was that the movement was united in its decision and that Adams and McGuinness had the support of the vast majority of the Republican family.
When Taoiseach/prime minister Albert Reynolds again pressed Clinton to secure his approval for Cahill's entry into the US, Clinton remarked: "Have you seen this guy's CV?" To which Reynolds is reputed to have replied "I didn't expect you to read that he was a member of the Legion of Mary [conservative Catholic group]". Once again, Reynolds argued for a visa, the British opposed it and Clinton was told by his State Department that his political credibility was on the line. In the end, the visa was granted.
However, all governments were weary of demands and tests. It was now time for Adams and Co. to call a ceasefire. Cahill went to the US and fortyeight hours later on 31 st August 1994, following 25 years of violence, the Provisional IRA called a complete cessation of military hostilities. For the first time in a quarter century, the guns and bombs of one of the most dangerous, disciplined and violent organisations fell silent. This was followed by the Loyalist ceasefire in October. The doors were eventually opened for Sinn Fein/IRA and the Loyalist parties to take their seats at the negotiation table. These thirteen years of peacemaking show that the de-escalation of protracted conflict between religious and ethnic parties is a slow process involving a journey of incremental relationship building and conflict analysis where the language gets fine-tuned. Irish Taoiseach (prime minster) Brian Cowen remarked some ten years later: "Peacemaking is a journey. Don't frontload the destination in the first few steps. Start the journey and let the destination take care of itself."
When protagonists engage with each other, they build confidence, trust and credibility, giving reassurances of their desire to get to negotiations. While early stages of this work are best done secretly through back channel third parties shuttling between the parties, the power of direct face to face dialogue is huge in melting enemy images. It enables parties to hear and understand how past collective events have affected their community, to unravel the political trauma of what happened and to tease out the political issues that have to be addressed to get to a settlement. Here is where the pumping of political oxygen by the governments into the intense discussions enabled the nationalist parties to re-imagine the fractured relationships and to create new political frameworks. Yet the missed opportunity was not being able to engage the unionist parties in a similar de-escalation process [as shown on the right hand side of Diagram 2]. They were unable to win the confidence of their own Protestant community and forge growing relationships between Britain and Ireland, Ireland and Northern Ireland as well as within Northern Ireland.
And now for the final lesson we really learned: that while we are all profoundly different in nature as human beings, yet united by destiny, we are here on these islands as British, Irish, Scottish, Welsh as well as a host of other identities. We can choose to make the future different from the past. As David Ervine, the Loyalist PUP leader, kept telling us: we may all be a victim of the hate that was handed down to us through "a taught process" about the past, it will skew our vision of the future if we are not able to be part of "a thought process" that rethinks our relations with others who are in conflict with us.
